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Le grand Autre: The Symbolic Order of Ideology 
 
Javier Padilla, 2010 
 
 
On the 19th of April, 2008, after decades of seclusion and abuse, Elisabeth Fritzl and her 
six children were liberated from the basement of her father’s house in Amstetten, Austria. 
The kids had been born in confinement, and had never been out in the real world. The 
Police chief reported that “they communicated with noises that were a mixture of 
growling and cooing” that was unintelligible to others. The question this unsettling 
anecdote poses is why these children could not communicate. Had they been dislocated 
from their position to the Other? If so, what, who, or where is this Other? The Other is 
the place that interpellates the subject into the symbolic order of ideology.   
 
 
 
But we seem to be getting ahead 
of ourselves. The only praxis that can 
solve the problematic nature of the Fritzl 
case is Psychoanalysis. The Fritzl 
children seem to exist in a pre-linguistic 
order, closer to the instinctive, 
unconscious drives of animals than to the 
sphere of human symbols. The 
discovery of Psychoanalysis by Sigmund 
Freud was the radical discovery that 
individual identity is based on the 
perpetual fragmentation or disintegration 
of the self wrought by the unconscious. 
As such, Freud’s contribution can be 
said to have inverted the Platonic world 
of ideas by locating them in the 
imaginary realm of distorted mirror 
images. Yet, for all of Freud’s 
contributions his theories have several 
loopholes and have been fraught with 
misinterpretations. Chief among these is 
the erroneous assumption that the 
unconscious is located deep within the 
confines of the individual’s brain. The 
unconscious is the place, according to 
popular psychology, where individuals 
hide their darkest desires. For ego-
psychologists, for instance, the ego can 
be strengthened so that it can cope with 
the unquenchable unconscious. However, 
they fail to understand that desire is 
inherently the desire of the Other.  
Constructing a framework whose 
aim is to save the radical elements of 
Freudian Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan 
holds that desire is intrinsically a social 
phenomenon that is articulated in 
language. 1 Yet, in order for the subject to 
enter this symbolic dimension of desire it 
must first go through what he calls the 
mirror stage:  
We have only to understand the 
mirror stage as an identification, 
in the full sense that analysis 
gives to the term: namely, the 
transformation that takes place in 
the subject when he assumes an 
image - whose predestination to 
this phase-effect is sufficiently 
                                                
1Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis (London: Norton, 
1998), 278 
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indicated by the use, in analytic 
theory, of the ancient term 
imago.2 
As such, this narcissistic encounter with 
reflection is constitutive of the subject in 
the imaginary order. The child becomes a 
little man—Lacan calls it a hommellete—
and mis-recognizes himself as a unified 
entity. Yet, this is an untenable illusion 
that at once constitutes and de-centers 
the human subject. After this extremely 
formative Meconnaissance in which the 
subject first ‘otherizes’ his own image, 
what role does the entrance of language 
into the human equation play? A very 
central one Lacan might answer. 
Reinvigorating Freud’s Oedipus 
complex, Lacan posits that the entrance 
of the Father signals a break in the 
child’s libidinal relationship with the 
Mother, and the child is “inserted into a 
structured world of symbolic meaning—
a world that shapes all interactions 
between the self and others.”3 Yet, can 
he articulate his identity using a system 
filled with gaps and based on a play of 
differences and deferrals? Can the child 
mirror, as it were, the imaginary 
plenitude with these new sounds he has 
learned from the Other? Not at all, Lacan 
holds, and desire, insofar as it is the 
impossible search for imaginary 
completeness, becomes inscribed in 
language.  
 Consequently, the Symbolic 
order is that which is constitutive of the 
subject by means of the Other. The 
problem, however, is that Lacan himself 
                                                
2 
http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/wyrick/debclass/laca
n.htm 
3 Anthony Elliott, Psychoanlytic Theory: An 
Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 95.  
refuses to define the Other in strict 
terms. And yet, this very fact signals one 
to a number of characteristics that 
describe it. Speaking about transference 
Lacan writes that “the Other, latent or 
not, is, even beforehand, present in the 
subjective revelation, It is already there, 
when something has begun to yield itself 
from the unconscious.” In other words, 
the Other is omnipresent in non-
metaphysical terms. When a person 
interviews another person, for example, 
it is not as if an ‘other’ is interviewing an 
‘other.’ They can communicate because 
the Other is there, already at work before 
they have begun speaking: “The Other, 
the capital Other, is already there in 
every opening of the unconscious.”4 In 
other words, the Symbolic order, 
constituted by the Other, is what places 
the de-centered subject in the chain of 
intersubjectivity. “The Other,” Lacan 
explains, “is the locus in which is 
situated in the chain of the signifier that 
governs whatever may be made present 
of the subject.”5 Outside of the Other 
nothing can be made present. The Fritzl 
kids, having no relation to the 
intersubjective chain of the Other, could 
not communicate. Inhabiting a private 
language that does not ‘mean,’ they had 
entered into the realm of psychosis.  
 Indeed, the astonishing gesture of 
Lacanian Psychoanalysis is that it 
unveils the endemic symbolic quality of 
social life. Therefore, Lacanian theory 
lends itself to social and cultural theory, 
and this is precisely what Louis 
Althusser does. Combining 
Psychoanalysis and Marxist theory he 
                                                
4 Lacan, 130. 
5 Lacan, 203.  
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holds that “there is no ideology except 
by the subject and for subjects.”6 
Ideology can be understood here as the 
inscription of the subject into the Law 
and language. Inherent in the nature of 
ideology is “the function (which defines 
it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals 
as subjects.”7 It establishes an imaginary 
relationship between the subject and the 
symbolic social network. Inscribed in its 
nature is the very fabric of the 
imaginary-symbolic to the Other, and—
much like the infant in front of the 
mirror—the subject misrecognizes 
himself in the Symbolic order of 
ideology. Like the Other, which is 
already there in every opening of the 
unconscious, ideological subjects are 
always already subjects participating, 
recreating, and inhabiting the 
omnipresence of ideology. As Althusser 
explains, ideology “has no outside (for 
itself), but at the same time that it is 
nothing but outside (for science and 
reality).”8 There is no reality outside the 
realm of ideology.  
 Nevertheless, once again we seem 
to be caught in the velocity of the 
Symbolic. One might ask how the 
subject becomes inscribed, interpellated 
in this overbearing Other. This is where 
things become problematic in 
Althusser’s argument. He holds that the 
“interpellation of individuals as subjects 
presupposes the ‘existence’ of a Unique 
and central Other Subject,” which makes 
the very idea of a pre-ideological subject 
                                                
6Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,  
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althuss
er/1970/ideology.htm 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. (Althusser’s emphasis.)  
an impossibility.9 The problem here is 
that Althusser presupposes the subject’s 
ability to recognize himself in the 
Symbolic order of ideology, and 
overdetermines the subject’s 
interpellation. As Anthony Elliot 
explains, in the Althusserian order 
“subjects are serenely inserted into the 
process of interpellation, and the 
possibilities for individual and political 
agency in turn vanish.”10 Thus, the 
objection is not merely political, but that 
the fragmentation of the self—
constitutive to Psychoanalysis itself—is 
dangerously simplified or forgotten. 
Desire and lack are left out of the 
Althusserian equation of ideology with 
the symbolic order.  
 Faced with this problematic 
relationship between Marxist theory and 
Psychoanalysis, Slavoj Zizek proposes a 
new connection beyond the Althusserian 
interpellation. For Zizek “ideology is not 
something which just magically goes to 
work on individuals, assigning social 
identities and roles in the act of 
producing itself, but is rather an 
overdetermined field of passionate 
assumptions and commitments.”11 
Ideology is ‘beyond’ in the sense that it 
is that which makes subjectivity 
possible, and can never be reduced to the 
cultural reproduction of meaning. In 
order to sustain this argument Zizek 
reformulates the idea of ideology by 
maintaining that it is an inherently 
paradoxical structure. The passage from 
the imaginary to the symbolic denotes a 
traumatic dimension that is never truly 
resolved and which is found in the nature 
                                                
9 Ibid.  
10 Elliot, 105.  
11 Elliot, 108.  
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of ideology itself. As Robert Pfaller 
explains:  
Since interpellation never seems 
to succeed totally, the subject 
seems to remain at a certain 
distance towards his/her 
“meaningful” identity given to 
him/her by interpellation, and 
precisely this meaningless 
remainder should be regarded as a 
condition of the subject’s 
submission to the “meaningless” 
command of the ideological 
rituals and apparatuses.12  
This gulf between the meaningless and 
the meaningful is that which constitutes 
the subject’s passage from the imaginary 
to the symbolic, and it is the paradox of 
ideological inscription. The relationship 
to the Other—for all Its pervasiveness 
and omnipresence—is inherently fragile.  
 As such, one might be tempted to 
conclude that Zizek proposes a 
seductive ‘return to Lacan’ in his 
conception of ideological interpellation. 
Central to the Lacanian edifice is the 
concept of Lanque, or Lack, which Lacan 
himself translates to the English 
neologism ‘want-to-be.’13 Lack, is 
therefore ‘central’ to the formation of the 
de-centered subject in the sense that it 
entails the subject’s desire for the unity 
of his being. It follows that lack would 
be central to the ideological edifice of 
symbolic intersubjectivity. Ideology is 
that which satisfies the lack in the 
interpellated subject by providing a 
structure that paradoxically fulfills and 
denies unity. The result of this paradox 
                                                
12 Slavoj Zizek ed., Cogito and the 
Unconscious, Durham: Duke University Press, 
1998), 229 
13 Lacan, 281.  
is that “the big Other is fragile, 
insubstantial, properly virtual, in the 
sense that its status is that of a 
subjective presupposition,” for “It exists 
only insofar as subjects act as if it 
exists.”14 This is why ideologies that 
seem to be fraught with contradictions—
the American dream and the lack of 
social mobility, proletarian revolution 
and the lack of equality among workers, 
religious belief and the lack of religious 
piety—thrive, even in the midst of 
incompleteness. Ideology, therefore, is 
related to the Other insofar as it provides 
subjects “the ultimate horizon of 
meaning to their lives, something for 
which these individuals are ready to give 
their lives, yet the only thing that really 
exists are these individuals and their 
activity.”15 It is better to be mystified by 
the Other’s paradoxical truths than to 
inhabit the realms of psychosis.  
 Consequently, Zizek’s 
conclusion is a very dark one. It is 
ultimately a position that renders “the 
ideological world empty of meaning.” 
While it seems to offer a place for a 
potentially seductive attack on the 
apparatuses of ideology, “it offers no 
basis for understanding the richly 
ambiguous links between desire and 
social action.”16 By debasing the subject 
to the perverse will of the Other, Zizek 
eliminates the possibility of a meaningful 
place for human identity.   
 Yet, we must now return to 
Austria, and to the problem of the 
children dislocated from the Other. It has 
                                                
14 Slavoj Zizek, Empty Gestures and 
Performatives: Lacan Confronts the CIA Plot 
http://www.lacan.com/zizciap.html 
15 Zizek, http://www.lacan.com/zizciap.html 
16 Elliot, 110.  
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been shown that, for Lacan, desire is 
decidedly shaped by a subject’s 
relationship to the Other’s desire. As 
such, the Austrian children can be said to 
lack the inscription in the 
intersubjectivity of the linguistic 
symbolic order. Moreover, Althusser 
would claim that they have not yet been 
interpellated into the ideology of the 
multitude. Zizek would elaborate on this 
and say that they have not yet been 
inscribed into the virtual, paradoxical 
world of the ideological Other. Lastly, 
one might be tempted to ask: why does 
their story frighten us? What is uncanny 
about someone not inscribed into the 
symbolic order? Perhaps they remind us 
of the fragility around our fiction. 
Perhaps their growls and coos tragically 
echo our own strivings for a unity that 
must remain elusive in order to exist. 
They remind us of a world without the 
ideological omnipresent, a-historical, 
eternal Other.  
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